2026-06-19 18:46:25 -05:00
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rules_version = '2';
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service firebase.storage {
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match /b/{bucket}/o {
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// Profile photos: only the owner may write; both the owner and their
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// partner can read via the tokenized download URL. Direct read is
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// scoped to the owner so raw storage paths aren't publicly accessible.
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//
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// Size cap: 5 MB. Content-type must be an image (enforced at upload,
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// not at read, so the header check only blocks mismatched writes).
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match /users/{uid}/profile.jpg {
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allow write: if request.auth != null
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&& request.auth.uid == uid
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&& request.resource.size < 5 * 1024 * 1024
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&& request.resource.contentType.matches('image/.*');
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// Partners receive the tokenized download URL (generated server-side or
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// at upload time) which bypasses these rules. Direct rule-based read is
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// scoped to the owner only.
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allow read: if request.auth != null && request.auth.uid == uid;
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}
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2026-06-24 15:20:44 -05:00
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// Encrypted chat media: the author writes under their own path (already E2E-encrypted
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// ciphertext, so Storage never holds anything readable). The partner reads via the tokenized
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// download URL, which bypasses these rules — same model as profile photos. 15 MB cap.
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match /users/{uid}/chat_media/{file} {
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allow write: if request.auth != null
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&& request.auth.uid == uid
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&& request.resource.size < 15 * 1024 * 1024;
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allow read: if request.auth != null && request.auth.uid == uid;
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}
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2026-06-19 18:46:25 -05:00
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// Deny all other paths by default.
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match /{allPaths=**} {
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allow read, write: if false;
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}
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}
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}
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