"use strict";
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Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
exports.AuthError = exports.ConfigError = exports.revenueCatWebhook = void 0;
exports.verifyWebhookSignature = verifyWebhookSignature;
const crypto = __importStar(require("crypto"));
const https_1 = require("firebase-functions/v2/https");
const params_1 = require("firebase-functions/params");
const entitlementLogic_1 = require("./entitlementLogic");
const log_1 = require("../log");
/**
 * RevenueCat webhook handler.
 *
 * Path: POST /revenueCatWebhook (registered as an HTTPS function)
 * Triggered by RevenueCat server-to-server events.
 *
 * Authentication — HMAC-SHA256 (RevenueCat's webhook "signature verification"):
 * - RevenueCat sends `X-RevenueCat-Webhook-Signature: t=<unix_ts>,v1=<hmac_sha256_hex>`.
 * - v1 = HMAC-SHA256(secret, "<t>.<raw_body>"), hex-encoded, computed over the RAW request
 *   body bytes exactly as received (before any JSON parsing / re-serialization).
 * - REVENUECAT_WEBHOOK_SECRET is the integration's signing secret from the RevenueCat
 *   dashboard (Integrations → Webhooks → enable signature verification). It is bound as a
 *   Secret Manager secret (below) and injected into process.env at runtime.
 * - Missing secret → 500 (our config error). Missing/invalid signature, or a timestamp
 *   outside the tolerance window (replay guard) → 401.
 *
 * NOTE: RevenueCat does NOT offer an Ed25519 / public-key signing scheme — HMAC-SHA256 with a
 * shared secret is the only cryptographic option (plus the optional static Authorization header).
 *
 * Processing:
 * - Parses the RevenueCat event payload.
 * - Writes entitlement state to Firestore at users/{userId}/entitlements.
 */
const revenueCatWebhookSecret = (0, params_1.defineSecret)('REVENUECAT_WEBHOOK_SECRET');
/** Reject signatures whose timestamp is further than this from now (replay protection). */
const SIGNATURE_TOLERANCE_MS = 5 * 60 * 1000;
exports.revenueCatWebhook = (0, https_1.onRequest)({ secrets: [revenueCatWebhookSecret] }, async (req, res) => {
    var _a;
    if (req.method !== 'POST') {
        res.status(405).json({ error: 'method_not_allowed' });
        return;
    }
    try {
        verifyRequest(req, Date.now());
    }
    catch (err) {
        if (err instanceof ConfigError) {
            log_1.logger.error('[revenueCatWebhook] configuration error', { error: err.message });
            res.status(500).json({ error: 'internal_error' });
            return;
        }
        res.status(401).json({ error: 'unauthorized' });
        return;
    }
    const event = (_a = req.body) === null || _a === void 0 ? void 0 : _a.event;
    if (!event || !event.type || !event.app_user_id) {
        res.status(400).json({ error: 'malformed_payload' });
        return;
    }
    // Security review Batch 2: process BEFORE acking. Previously we returned 200 up front
    // and only logged failures, so a failed entitlement sync was silently dropped (no retry).
    // RevenueCat retries on non-2xx, and applyEntitlementEvent is idempotent (it sets state),
    // so returning 500 on failure recovers the event safely.
    try {
        await (0, entitlementLogic_1.applyEntitlementEvent)(event);
    }
    catch (err) {
        log_1.logger.error('[revenueCatWebhook] entitlement sync failed', { error: String(err) });
        res.status(500).json({ error: 'processing_failed' });
        return;
    }
    res.status(200).json({ received: true });
});
class ConfigError extends Error {
}
exports.ConfigError = ConfigError;
class AuthError extends Error {
}
exports.AuthError = AuthError;
/**
 * Reads the secret + signature header off the request and delegates to the pure verifier.
 * Throws ConfigError when our secret is unset (→500); AuthError for any auth failure (→401).
 */
function verifyRequest(req, nowMs) {
    const secret = process.env.REVENUECAT_WEBHOOK_SECRET;
    if (!secret) {
        throw new ConfigError('REVENUECAT_WEBHOOK_SECRET environment variable is not set');
    }
    // Firebase Functions expose the raw request body as req.rawBody (Buffer).
    const rawBody = req.rawBody;
    const sigHeader = req.headers['x-revenuecat-webhook-signature'];
    const header = Array.isArray(sigHeader) ? sigHeader[0] : sigHeader;
    verifyWebhookSignature({ rawBody, header, secret, nowMs });
}
/**
 * Pure, testable HMAC-SHA256 verification of a RevenueCat webhook signature.
 *
 * Parses `t=<unix_ts>,v1=<hex>` from the header, recomputes HMAC-SHA256 over "<t>.<rawBody>"
 * with the signing secret, constant-time-compares against v1, and rejects timestamps outside
 * the tolerance window. Throws AuthError on any failure (caller maps to 401).
 */
function verifyWebhookSignature(opts) {
    var _a;
    const { rawBody, header, secret, nowMs } = opts;
    const toleranceMs = (_a = opts.toleranceMs) !== null && _a !== void 0 ? _a : SIGNATURE_TOLERANCE_MS;
    if (!rawBody || rawBody.length === 0) {
        throw new AuthError('request body missing');
    }
    if (!header) {
        throw new AuthError('signature header missing');
    }
    // Parse "t=<ts>,v1=<hex>" — order-independent, tolerant of extra fields.
    let t;
    let v1;
    for (const part of header.split(',')) {
        const seg = part.trim();
        const eq = seg.indexOf('=');
        if (eq < 0)
            continue;
        const key = seg.slice(0, eq);
        const val = seg.slice(eq + 1);
        if (key === 't')
            t = val;
        else if (key === 'v1')
            v1 = val;
    }
    if (!t || !v1) {
        throw new AuthError('signature header malformed');
    }
    const tsMs = Number(t) * 1000;
    if (!Number.isFinite(tsMs)) {
        throw new AuthError('signature timestamp invalid');
    }
    if (Math.abs(nowMs - tsMs) > toleranceMs) {
        throw new AuthError('signature timestamp outside tolerance');
    }
    // HMAC over the RAW body bytes, prefixed with "<t>." — never re-serialize the JSON.
    const signedPayload = Buffer.concat([Buffer.from(`${t}.`, 'utf8'), rawBody]);
    const expected = crypto.createHmac('sha256', secret).update(signedPayload).digest('hex');
    // Constant-time compare. timingSafeEqual throws on length mismatch, so guard the length first.
    const expectedBuf = Buffer.from(expected, 'utf8');
    const providedBuf = Buffer.from(v1, 'utf8');
    if (expectedBuf.length !== providedBuf.length || !crypto.timingSafeEqual(expectedBuf, providedBuf)) {
        throw new AuthError('signature mismatch');
    }
}
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