chore(repo): put the template under version control
The basis for every project here was itself unversioned: no .git, no remote,
no history. Changes to it had no diff and no revert, and two of its own guards
could not run at all -- doc-claims.sh and doc-triggers.py both read git
history, so the script written to catch documentation drift could not be run
against the documents that define drift.
This is the tree as it stands, including work that until now existed only as
loose files on disk: WORK_CYCLE.md, TOOLS.md, the Portainer image-line fix in
deploy.py, the status vocabulary corrected to the four words the conformance
checker actually enforces, the Exempt: mechanism documented, and the Forgejo
instance named in README.md.
secrets.sh --tracked reports one candidate, migrate.sh:480. It is the comment
documenting the three Postgres credential shapes that script redacts, with
literal placeholders, and it is left alone deliberately: GUARDS.md section 2
is that a source-grep guard must tell code from the comment about code, and
deleting an explanation to quiet a scanner is the failure it names.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-17 22:44:26 -05:00
# Claude QA Plan — <Project>
```
Status: Current
Owner: < who maintains this >
Last reviewed: < YYYY-MM-DD >
Governs: what a QA round consists of
Review trigger: Any new user-facing surface, or a defect class that got through
```
> The playbook. What a round *is*, so two rounds are comparable and a gap is
> visible rather than assumed covered.
## Before a round
- Build from a clean checkout at a known SHA, and record that SHA.
- Run from a detached worktree if other work is in flight, so uncommitted
changes cannot contaminate what is under test.
- Note the environment: device, OS version, browser, screen size — whatever the
product's behaviour actually depends on.
## The passes
Each pass gets a letter, so `ClaudeQACoverage.md` can report per pass and a
skipped one is visible.
| Pass | What it covers |
| --- | --- |
| A | First run: install or load, cold start, permissions, empty states |
| B | The core flow, end to end, as a real user would do it |
| C | The core flow with things going wrong: no network, denied permission, invalid input |
| D | Persistence: quit and return, background and resume, restart |
| E | The end of the loop — the state that is hardest to reach on purpose |
| F | Accessibility: keyboard only, screen reader labels, contrast, text scaling |
| G | Performance under the load this product will actually see |
feat(qa): pass H, authorization and abuse
The passes stopped at G, and A-G share an assumption that hides an entire class
of defect: every one of them asks a legitimate user to do legitimate things.
Nothing looked at what happens when the caller is not who they claim, does not
own what they ask for, or asks too often.
That assumption has already cost this portfolio once. requireCoupleContext in
Closer-Couples never verified the caller belonged to the couple whose data was
returned -- authentication present, correct, and proving nothing about
ownership. No pass A-G would have found it.
Pass H covers six cases: authenticated endpoints called logged-out, a list
endpoint checked for rows the caller should not see, User A requesting User B's
object by id, a privileged route opened as an ordinary user, the expensive
endpoint hit repeatedly, and the built bundle and localStorage inspected.
The organising sentence, which is the reason it is a separate pass rather than
more rows in B: authenticated is not the same as owning, and neither is the
same as permitted.
closes #2
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-17 22:53:53 -05:00
| H | Authorization and abuse: every authenticated endpoint called logged-out; a list endpoint checked for rows the caller should not see; User A requesting User B's object by id; a privileged route opened as an ordinary user; the most expensive endpoint hit repeatedly; the built bundle and `localStorage` inspected for anything secret |
chore(repo): put the template under version control
The basis for every project here was itself unversioned: no .git, no remote,
no history. Changes to it had no diff and no revert, and two of its own guards
could not run at all -- doc-claims.sh and doc-triggers.py both read git
history, so the script written to catch documentation drift could not be run
against the documents that define drift.
This is the tree as it stands, including work that until now existed only as
loose files on disk: WORK_CYCLE.md, TOOLS.md, the Portainer image-line fix in
deploy.py, the status vocabulary corrected to the four words the conformance
checker actually enforces, the Exempt: mechanism documented, and the Forgejo
instance named in README.md.
secrets.sh --tracked reports one candidate, migrate.sh:480. It is the comment
documenting the three Postgres credential shapes that script redacts, with
literal placeholders, and it is left alone deliberately: GUARDS.md section 2
is that a source-grep guard must tell code from the comment about code, and
deleting an explanation to quiet a scanner is the failure it names.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-17 22:44:26 -05:00
< Add , remove and rename to fit . A pass that never applies is noise ; a pass that
is always skipped is a lie.>
feat(qa): pass H, authorization and abuse
The passes stopped at G, and A-G share an assumption that hides an entire class
of defect: every one of them asks a legitimate user to do legitimate things.
Nothing looked at what happens when the caller is not who they claim, does not
own what they ask for, or asks too often.
That assumption has already cost this portfolio once. requireCoupleContext in
Closer-Couples never verified the caller belonged to the couple whose data was
returned -- authentication present, correct, and proving nothing about
ownership. No pass A-G would have found it.
Pass H covers six cases: authenticated endpoints called logged-out, a list
endpoint checked for rows the caller should not see, User A requesting User B's
object by id, a privileged route opened as an ordinary user, the expensive
endpoint hit repeatedly, and the built bundle and localStorage inspected.
The organising sentence, which is the reason it is a separate pass rather than
more rows in B: authenticated is not the same as owning, and neither is the
same as permitted.
closes #2
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-17 22:53:53 -05:00
### Why H is separate from B
**Authenticated is not the same as owning, and neither is the same as
permitted.** Login is the front door; every room inside still needs its own
lock. Pass B walks the flow as a real user, which means it walks it as a user
who is entitled to everything it touches — so B cannot see the entire class of
defect where the entitlement was never checked.
This has already cost this portfolio once. `requireCoupleContext` never verified
that the caller belonged to the couple whose data was being returned:
authentication was present, correct, and proved nothing. No pass A-G would have
looked for it, because every one of them asks a legitimate user to do legitimate
things.
Run H as somebody who is not entitled: logged out, logged in as the wrong
person, and logged in as the right person asking too often.
chore(repo): put the template under version control
The basis for every project here was itself unversioned: no .git, no remote,
no history. Changes to it had no diff and no revert, and two of its own guards
could not run at all -- doc-claims.sh and doc-triggers.py both read git
history, so the script written to catch documentation drift could not be run
against the documents that define drift.
This is the tree as it stands, including work that until now existed only as
loose files on disk: WORK_CYCLE.md, TOOLS.md, the Portainer image-line fix in
deploy.py, the status vocabulary corrected to the four words the conformance
checker actually enforces, the Exempt: mechanism documented, and the Forgejo
instance named in README.md.
secrets.sh --tracked reports one candidate, migrate.sh:480. It is the comment
documenting the three Postgres credential shapes that script redacts, with
literal placeholders, and it is left alone deliberately: GUARDS.md section 2
is that a source-grep guard must tell code from the comment about code, and
deleting an explanation to quiet a scanner is the failure it names.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-17 22:44:26 -05:00
## What counts as a finding
A finding needs: what was done, what happened, what should have happened, and
the build SHA. Without the SHA it cannot be re-tested, and a finding that cannot
be re-tested cannot be closed.
## Severity
Findings are filed as issues, labelled:
- **P0** — ships broken, or loses data
- **P1** — materially wrong, but shippable
- **P2** — cosmetic or low impact
- **release-blocker** — a release built today would be wrong rather than merely
incomplete
Exactly these label names: the Command Center queries them by name, and a
repository that spells them differently has its defects reported as *not
adopted* rather than counted wrongly.
Severity is what it costs, not how annoying it is to fix.
## After a round
File each finding as a labelled issue. Update `ClaudeReport.md` 's run-state
block and its overall sentence, and `ClaudeQACoverage.md` with what each pass
actually reached. A pass that could
not be run is recorded as blocked, with what blocks it — never quietly left out,
which reads identically to "passed".
Then **push, and reconcile** . The verdict on the project screen at
privacyllc.dev is read out of `ClaudeReport.md` in the pushed repository, so a
round whose report is committed but not pushed — or pushed but not reconciled —
leaves a stakeholder reading the previous round's judgment with no indication
that a newer one exists. The rest of the cycle is in `docs/WORK_CYCLE.md` .