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Queue-North-Website/docs/OPERATIONS.md

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Operations — Queue North Website

Status: Current
Owner: _null
Last reviewed: 2026-08-18
Governs: Dockerfile, docker-compose.yml, scripts/status.sh,
         scripts/healthcheck.sh, scripts/backup.sh, scripts/restore-check.sh —
         what watches this in production, and what to do when it stops
Review trigger: A new alert or a new place errors are sent; a change to the
                backup schedule or the restore procedure; any change to the
                deploy host, container or image; any incident whose first ten
                minutes were spent working out what to run

Why this exists

Every other document here describes what the project is. This one describes what happens when it stops being that at three in the morning, and it is the only document written for somebody who is not thinking clearly.

The failure it prevents is specific: the first ten minutes of an incident spent working out which host, which container, and which command, while the thing everybody actually wants to know — is it down, or is it just unreachable from here — goes unanswered.

What is deployed, and where
Public origin https://qn.isnull.dev, fronted by Cloudflare
Host nebula (192.168.1.11) — the same box as the Forgejo instance
Container qn-website-dev
Image dream.scheller.ltd/null/queue-north-website:dev
Port 3001 in the container; the reverse proxy in front owns the public one
Database /app/db/queuenorth.db, in the named volume qn-website-dev_queuenorth-db
Logs volume qn-website-dev_queuenorth-logs → /app/logs
Runs as UID 1001, non-root

queuenorth.com also resolves and returns 200. It is not this deployment — it is the customer's own domain and is not served by this container. Do not diagnose against it.

Where errors go

Nowhere. This project has no error tracking.

Said in one line rather than left blank, because a gap somebody chose is a different thing from a gap nobody noticed. There is no Sentry project, no DSN and no alert destination. An unhandled exception is logged to the container's stdout and takes the process down: server/index.js handles uncaughtException and unhandledRejection by logging and exiting 1, and Docker's restart: unless-stopped brings it back. That means a crash loop looks like a running service to anything that only reads a state. scripts/status.sh reports the restart count for exactly this reason.

A liveness tick is not error tracking. scripts/healthcheck.sh answers is it up. Nothing here answers is it working — a server returning 500 to every form submission is up, healthy, and losing every lead.

What alerts, and to whom

Signal Where it goes Who acts on it
Container HEALTHCHECK fails 3× at 30 s Docker marks the container unhealthy on nebula Nobody, automatically. It is visible to anyone who looks and notifies no one
scripts/healthcheck.sh whoever runs it not scheduled
Everything else — —

This table is nearly empty and that is the honest state. Nothing on this project pages anybody. The site could be down for a day and the first report would come from the customer.

Two things would change that and neither is filed as work yet: scheduling healthcheck.sh somewhere that can shout, and giving the process somewhere to send an exception. Recorded here rather than invented into the tracker.

Backups
Schedule None yet. scripts/backup.sh works and nothing runs it on a timer
What is captured /app/db/queuenorth.db — the leads and support_requests tables. Deliberately not captured: the logs volume, and the environment, which holds the secrets
Where it lands $HOME/backups/queue-north-website on the operator's machine, mode 700. Still one machine — see below
Retention BACKUP_KEEP, default 7
Last verified restore 2026-08-18, by _null — 2 tables, 3 rows, restored in under 1 s

scripts/backup.sh proves a dump is readable before trusting it — it runs better-sqlite3's online .backup() inside the container, copies the result out, and refuses the run unless PRAGMA integrity_check returns ok and the table count is plausible, only then renaming it into place. scripts/restore-check.sh proves it can be restored, which is a different claim: a file that parses is not a database you can get back.

A backup nobody has restored is a guess. The date above is the only line in this table that says otherwise, and as of 2026-08-18 it says something: a snapshot was taken from the running container, replayed into a scratch database from SQL, and counted. It came back.

Two things that are still true anyway, and both are tracked in Batch 15:

  1. Nothing runs on a schedule. One backup taken by hand is not a backup regime. Until a timer exists, the newest dump is as old as the last time somebody remembered.
  2. The dump lives on one machine, beside nothing. backup.sh says this itself on every run: a backup that only exists beside the database it came from does not survive the disk, the host or the account. It is currently on the operator's workstation and nowhere else.

The exposure is worth stating plainly: /app/db/queuenorth.db is the only live copy of every lead and support request the site has ever taken, it lives in one Docker volume on one host, and it took writes today.

A number worth knowing before you need it: the restore took under a second, because the database is 28 KB and holds three leads. That will stay true for a long time at this volume — this is a contact form, not a transactional system — so during an incident, restoring is cheap and there is no reason to hesitate over it.

RESTORE_MIN_ROWS is currently 0, which means the check cannot yet catch the snapshot-of-an-empty-volume case. Set it to something below the real lead count once that count is meaningful, and it starts catching the one failure a structural check never can.

Rate limits and cost ceilings

(precautionary — no incident here has yet come from this.)

Endpoint or job What it costs per call What bounds it
POST /api/leads one SQLite insert, one reCAPTCHA verify, one Zoho form post RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE, default 5, per IP across all of /api. Body capped at 1 MB, request at 30 s
POST /api/support the same, plus a Zoho Case when enabled same limiter
Google reCAPTCHA free at this volume the same limiter, upstream of it
Zoho CRM free at this volume; the API path has per-org daily credits fire-and-forget, so exhausting them degrades CRM sync and never the site

Where does the spend alert go, and at what number? Nowhere, and there is no number. Nothing here bills per call at this volume, which is why that is tolerable rather than an oversight — but if an LLM, a mail sender or a paid API is ever added, this table is the first thing that has to change.

It is down — what now

In this order. Each step is a command that answers one question, and none of them change anything.

  1. Is it actually down, or unreachable from here? bash scripts/healthcheck.sh from anywhere, then bash scripts/status.sh. The second distinguishes those two and reports the restart count. A climbing restart count with a short uptime is a crash loop, not a healthy service, and reads as "running" in every tool that shows only a state.

  2. What is it saying? bash scripts/status.sh --logs 200.

  3. Is the deployed version the one you think? bash scripts/status.sh prints the image digest. --deployed-version cannot answer here — the image carries no org.opencontainers.image.version label, so the script correctly reports the version as unknown rather than guessing. Compare the digest against the registry instead:

    bash scripts/status.sh | grep digest

    Adding that label at build time would make this step a one-liner and is worth doing next time the Dockerfile is touched.

  4. Is it the database? /api/health returns 503 with db: error when the SELECT 1 fails. That is a real answer and not an outage of the whole site: the marketing pages keep serving while every form submission is failing.

  5. Did something change recently? The tracker and git log — a deploy, a config edit, a Cloudflare rule.

  6. Is it Cloudflare rather than us? Compare a request to the origin on nebula against one to qn.isnull.dev. Cloudflare fronts everything here, including the Forgejo instance on the same host.

Rolling forward or back

This is the gap in this runbook and it is named rather than papered over.

Publishing is npm run docker:push, which builds and pushes queue-north-website:dev to the Forgejo registry. How nebula then moves to the new image — a compose file on the host, a Portainer stack, a watchtower, a manual docker pull && docker compose up -d — is not written down anywhere in this repository, and was not recoverable from it on 2026-08-18.

Until somebody writes it here, a rollback is: find the previous image digest in the registry, and do on nebula whatever it is that normally happens. That is not a procedure. The template's deploy.py was deliberately not adopted for this reason — a deploy script pointed at a path nobody has confirmed is worse than no deploy script.

Write the incident down afterwards, in docs/history/DEVELOPMENT_LOG.md with the date, and file what broke as an issue with a severity label. An incident nobody recorded happens again with the same surprise.